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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 enabled thestates of Central Asia to rediscover their Chineseneighbour, excluded from the economic and cultural
reality of the region during the years of Sino-Soviet conflict.
In less than two decades, Beijing has taken advantage of the
disappearance of its Soviet neighbour to launch its program
of development of the “Great West” and open up Xinjiang
to border nations, while the states of Central Asia, seeking
new partners, have sought to benefit from China’s dynamism
by integrating themselves into the Asia-Pacific zone of pros-
perity. While the Chinese authorities may make a point of
honour in establishing cordial relations with the five states of
the region, Kazakhstan enjoys a particular status: indeed,
the China-Kazakhstan partnership is termed “strategic,” the
highest of diplomatic epithets, confirming Astana as a major
political ally of Beijing in a post-Soviet climate in which the
Kazakh government is displaying balanced and diversified
policies in the face of Moscow’s heavy-handed presence. (1)
This privileged China-Kazakhstan partnership is based on a
multifaceted economic reality. These days, China-
Kazakhstan trade represents more than two-thirds (about 70
percent) of all China-Central Asia trade. Unlike the other
historical power in the region, Islam Karimov’s Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan, under the leadership of President Nursultan
Nazarbaev since 1989, has undertaken important economic
liberalisation reforms that, despite their limitations, are now
succeeding in attracting foreign investment. (2) Kazakhstan
has thus become the second richest country in the post-
Soviet space: with a GDP estimated at $9,400 per capita in
2006, it sits just behind Russia (with approximately
$12,000) but ahead of the other Central Asian countries
(between $8,500 and $1,300). In 15 years, it has succeed-
ed in dramatically halving the portion of its population living
below the poverty line (now less than 25 percent), whereas
in the other four states of the region, more than half of the
population is still considered “poor.” In addition, the coun-
try has seen the emergence of a middle class, a guarantee of
longer-term stability.
The exponential growth in economic relations with China
since the beginning of the 1990s has not once been chal-
lenged. Kazakhstan even opened a consulate in Hong Kong
in 2003 and one in Shanghai in 2005 to facilitate contact.
Nevertheless, economic relations between the two countries
reveal multiple imbalances that are increasingly raising ques-
tions within Kazakhstan’s political class and among local
experts. While the official Chinese position extols the com-
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1. On relations between China and Central Asia, see Thierry Kellner, L’Occident de la Chine,
Pékin et la nouvelle Asie centrale (1991-2001) (Western China, Beijing and the new
Central Asia [1991-2001]), Paris, PUF, 2007, Thierry Kellner, “La tranquille montée en
puissance de la Chine en Asie centrale” (The peaceful rise of China’s power in Central
Asia), La Revue internationale et stratégique, no. 64, 2007, pp. 143-154, Valérie Niquet,
“La Chine et l’Asie centrale” (China and Central Asia), Perspectives chinoises, no. 96,
2006, http://perspectiveschinoises.revues.org/document995.html, consulted 15 August
2008.
2. For an economic evaluation of the region since independence, see Richard Pomfret, The
Central Asian Economies since Independence, Princeton-Oxford, Princeton University
Press, 2006. On the political situation in Central Asia, see Marlène Laruelle, Sébastien
Peyrouse, Asie centrale, la dérive autoritaire. Cinq républiques entre héritage soviétique,
dictature et islam (Central Asia’s drift toward authoritarianism: Five republics between
Soviet heritage, dictatorship and Islam), Paris, Autrement-CERI, 2005. 
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In the course of only a decade, Kazakhstan has become China’s second biggest partner behind Russia in the post-
Soviet space. Economic relations between Astana and Beijing are characterised by a considerable imbalance of power
that is of concern in some political and expert circles in Kazakhstan, while the tremendous opportunity for
development offered by China’s proximity brings hope that the country might be extricated from the crisis that
followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
plementarity of the two economies and the mutual benefit of
trade, this optimistic view is largely disputed on the ground.
Kazakh concerns over possible Chinese domination are
based not only on economic arguments. They need to be sit-
uated in a social context in which fear of China remains very
real: the general lack of knowledge about China, and fear of
too great a difference in demographic power, might well be
important factors influencing Kazakh reactions to China’s
growing presence. St ruct ur ing  of  bi la ter a le co nom ic re la ti ons
If the agreements signed by Beijing and Astana in the 1990s
were primarily diplomatic (in a strategy of “good neigh-
bourliness” and settlement of border disputes), they have
taken a distinctly more economic turn since then. In June
2003, on the occasion of Hu Jintao’s visit to Kazakhstan, a
program of cooperation between the two countries was
adopted for the period 2003-2008. Nursultan Nazarbaev’s
visit to China in December 2006 led to the signing of a
“cooperation strategy for the twenty-first century” and a
“plan for economic cooperation between Kazakhstan and
China.” Finally, another visit by Hu Jintao to Astana in
August 2007 saw the signing of a program of bilateral coop-
eration in the economic sectors not related to raw materials,
complemented by a Memorandum of Cooperation for the
following three years (2008-2010). (3) In April 2008, the
Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov launched this pro-
gram at the Chinese-Kazakh businessmen’s forum. (4) For the
Kazakhstan economy, the stakes are considerable: it is a
matter of avoiding over-specialisation in the export of raw
materials and maximising growth in the acquisition of tech-
nologies from China.
E xpo n en ti al  gr ow th i n b ila tera l  tr ade  -t rig ger in g deba te  in  Ka zakh s tan
Several bilateral committees have been created to encourage
trade. (5) The main one is the China-Kazakhstan
Cooperation Committee, established in 2004 and led by the
Chinese and Kazakh Prime Ministers. It comprises around
a dozen specialist sub-committees, for example on finance,
biotechnology, petroleum and gas, and the use of nuclear
energy for civilian purposes. It is criticised in some circles for
its lack of transparency, and the consequent possibility that
the Chinese authorities could buy decisions to their advan-
tage. Indeed, the increase in China’s political influence in
Central Asia is becoming a sensitive question, with the
growing phenomenon of influence groups that are consid-
ered shameful and dangerous for their potential to discredit
a portion of the elite, or indeed even heads of state. The
Kazakh media regularly publish remarks by local analysts
and political opponents denouncing the presence of an influ-
ential “Chinese lobby” within official economic circles and
embodied by the China-Kazakhstan Committee, among oth-
ers. (6)
For Kazakhstan, the future of economic relations with China
is bilateral. The China-Kazakhstan relationship will be
strengthened even further by Astana’s accession to the
World Trade Organisation (WTO), which will enable
Chinese companies to invest more in the Kazakh market.
Economic relations are also developing to a certain degree
in a multilateral context through the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO), even if China’s presence by way of
the SCO is considerably greater in Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan. Thus, the $900 million of credit proposed by
Beijing in 2004 – and implemented from 2006 onwards –
was destined primarily for the region’s poorest states, not for
Kazakhstan. (7) Nevertheless, the Organisation has instigated
projects involving all the Central Asian states, such as the
Caspian Sea-China highway that starts in Russia and cross-
es Kazakhstan, rail connections, and the construction of
hydroelectric power stations. However, despite the measures
adopted by the SCO Business Council to strengthen link-
ages between the Central Asian states, government-to-gov-
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3. Gulzhakhan Khadzhieva, “Kazakhstan i Kitaj: strategicheskie podkhody k ekonomich-
eskomu sotrudnichestvu” (Kazakhstan and China: Strategic approaches to economic
cooperation), in Marlène Laruelle, Sébastien Peyrouse (eds.), Central’naja Azija-Kitaj: ot
geopolitiki k partnerstvu (Central Asia – China: From geopolitics to partnership), Almaty,
KISI, 2008.
4. “Po itogam 2007 goda Kitaj zanimaet 4oe mesto v spiske torgovykh partnerov
Kazakhstana” (According to the 2007 statistics, China is in fourth position among
Kazakhstan’s trade partners), 24 June 2008, http://news.zakon.kz/main/news/busi-
ness_and_finance/4406-po-itogam-2007-goda-kitajj-zanimaet-4.html, consulted 11
August 2008. 
5. Gul’den Zholamanova, “O nekotorykh aspektakh kazakhstansko-kitajskogo ekonomich-
eskogo sotrudnichestva v ramkakh SHOS: Politologicheskij analiz” (Aspects of China-
Kazakhstan cooperation in the context of the SCO: Politological analysis), Analytic, no. 1,
2008, pp. 27-37.
6. Discussions in Almaty with Dosym Satpaev, 6 March 2008, and Konstantin Syroezhkin,
4 March 2008.
7. lida Ashimbaeva, “Dostizhenija i problemy kazakhstansko-kitajskikh ekonomicheskikh
otnoshenij” (Outcomes and problems in China-Kazakhstan economic relations), 22
March 2007, http://www.postsoviet.ru/page.php?pid=118, consulted 12 August 2008.
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Official meeting between Chinese President Hu Jintao
and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev, 
August 18, 2007, Astana. 
© AFP
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ernment disagreements often delay their implementation. (8)
Several Kazakh specialists also complain of the SCO’s
inability to promote its economic strategies in business cir-
cles; some of its decisions are said to remain declarations of
intent due to a lack of information among business leaders. (9)
It is difficult to obtain a precise assessment of China-
Kazakhstan trade figures. The official statistics take little
account of the extent of cross-border trade, and cannot meas-
ure the amount of illegal trade, particularly in metals, (10) or
contraband, such as acetic anhydride, the chemical required
to turn opium into heroin. (11) Some local specialists point out
significant differences between the Chinese and Kazakh sta-
tistics. Thus, when Kazakhstan claimed $550 million of
trade with China in 1999, Beijing was already confirming
more than $1 billion. In 2005, the discrepancy grew wider:
Kazakhstan, according to Astana, apparently achieved
imports from China with a total value of $1.2 billion, com-
pared to almost $4 billion according to Beijing, and Astana
reported exports to China worth nearly $2.5 billion, exceed-
ing the Chinese figures by more than $500 million. (12) The
discrepancy can be attributed partly to political reasons:
Astana seeks to overvalue its exports and undervalue
Chinese imports in order to reduce a trade balance skewed
too greatly in China’s favour. In 2006, Kazakhstan’s trade
deficit in relation to its neighbour was at least $1.14 billion,
15 percent more than in 2005. (13) On the other hand, the
discrepancy can be explained by differences in accounting;
Kazakh businessmen have every reason to undervalue their
trade flows in order to avoid taxes, unlike their Chinese
counterparts, who receive tax concessions on exports. (14)
China’s progress is so great that Beijing will soon catch up
to Kazakhstan’s main trade partner, Russia. In 1992, China-
Central Asia trade, two-thirds of which is China-Kazakhstan
trade, was barely $422 million, reaching $512 million in
1993. It plummeted in 1994 as a result of stricter visa
processes, then rapidly climbed again, reaching $699 million
in 1997. (15) It experienced a decrease ($588 million) again
as a result of the Russian economic crisis of the summer of
1998, which similarly affected Central Asia, then began to
grow at a rate that seems unstoppable now. Trade passed $1
billion in 2000 before rising tenfold to more than $10 billion
in 2006. The volume of trade tripled between 2002 and
2005, but continued to largely favour Chinese exports,
which represented two thirds compared to Central Asia’s
one third. Thus, in 2006, China represented 15.5 percent of
Kazakhstan’s foreign trade (almost $9 billion), nearing
Russia’s 18.8 percent (almost $11 billion). (16) China’s Trade
Ministry quoted a figure of $10.8 billion, which would put
Moscow and Beijing on an equal footing, (17) while Vladimir
Paramonov and Aleksei Strokov add another $2 billion or
more in illegal trade, which would give China trade suprema-
cy over Russia. (18) According to Kazakh experts, the bilater-
al trade figure is expected to reach $15 billion in 2008. (19)
The imbalance of power between China and Kazakhstan
remains glaringly obvious. In 2006, Kazakhstan represented
only 0.49 percent of China’s foreign trade (the whole of
Central Asia representing 0.60 percent). (20) This imbalance
is shifting to foreign investment: in 2005, China injected
$1.2 billion into the Kazakh economy (82 percent in the
hydrocarbon sector and 14 percent in the construction sec-
tor), whereas Kazakhstan invested only $7.6 million in
China. (21) The Chinese and Kazakh economies are, howev-
er, proving to be complementary to a large degree. More
than 80 percent of China’s exports to Kazakhstan are fin-
ished consumer items (textiles, shoes, appliances, toys, elec-
tronics, spare parts, pharmaceutical products, foodstuffs),
while 85 percent of Kazakhstan’s exports to China consist of
raw materials (petroleum, ferrous and non-ferrous metals). (22)
In some sectors such as aluminium, the unidirectional nature
of trade flows is impressive: more than 95 percent of Kazakh
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8. Gul’den Zholamanova, “O nekotorykh aspektakh kazakhstansko-kitajskogo ekonomich-
eskogo sotrudnichestva v ramkakh SHOS: Politologicheskij analiz,” op. cit., pp. 27-37.
9. Ibid., p. 30.
10. Railia Mukimdzhanova, Strany Central’noj Azii. Azijatskij vektor vneshnej politiki (The
countries of Central Asia: The Asian vehicle of foreign policy), Moscow, Nauchnaja kniga,
2005, 201 pp.
11. “Precursor Control on Central Asia’s Borders with China,” United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime Regional Office for Central Asia, Vienna, no date of publication.
12. “Sindrom Khorgosa?” (The Khorgos syndrome?), Kazakhstanskaja pravda, 27 May
2005, http://www.nomad.su/?a=13-200605290119, consulted 19 August 2008.
13. Information provided on the site of the Embassy of Kazakhstan in China:
http://www.kazembchina.org/create/bike/home.jsp?tablename=itemcontent&iiid=738
6256821857348225&tableFlag=itemtable, consulted 19 August 2008.
14. Gaël Raballand, Agnès Andrésy, “Why should Trade between Central Asia and China
Continue to Expand?,” Asia Europe Journal, vol. 5, no. 2, 2007, pp. 235-252.
15. Vladimir Paramonov, Aleksej Strokov, “Ekonomicheskoe prisutstvie Rossii i Kitaja v
Central’noj Azii” (The economic presence of Russia and China in Central Asia), Conflict
Studies Research Centre, Central Asian Series, 07/12, 2007, p. 4.
16. Ibid., p. 6.
17. Ibid., p. 9.
18. Ibid., p. 8.
19. “Kazakhstan i Kitaj podpisali memorandum o sotrudnichestve” (Kazakhstan and China
have signed a memorandum of cooperation), http://www.rosbalt.biz/2008/06/
24/497067.html, consulted 12 July 2008.
20. Vladimir Paramonov, Aleksej Strokov, “Ekonomicheskoe prisutstvie Rossii i Kitaja v
Central’noj Azii,” op. cit., p. 6.
21. lida Ashimbaeva, “Dostizhenija i problemy kazakhstansko-kitajskikh ekonomicheskikh
otnoshenij,” op. cit.
22. Hsiu-Ling Wu, Chien-Hsun Chen, “The Prospects for Regional Economic Integration
Between China and the Five Central Asian Countries,” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 56, no.
7, 2004, pp. 1059-1080. 
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aluminium exports are destined for China. (23) In metals, in
addition to uranium (cf. infra), China is similarly seeking a
foothold in the Kazakh gold market. Thus, in 2005, the
China National Gold Group Association and the metals
venture Kazakhaltyn Mining signed a contract initiating a
joint venture for gold mining in Kazakhstan. (24)
This structuring of bilateral trade enjoys far from unanimous
support: more and more Kazakh experts denounce the com-
partmentalisation of the national economy into raw materials
and the selling off of the country’s last processing and agri-
food industries. The situation is strongly criticised, for exam-
ple, by Alida Ashimbaeva, Director of the Institute of the
World Market in Almaty, (25) who believes that this situation
jeopardises Kazakhstan’s economic independence, and by
Konstantin Syroezhkin, the main China expert at the
Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies, who asserts that
“China’s economic successes are objectively running con-
trary to all the economic interests of Central Asia in the sec-
tor of industrial processing and to a certain extent in agricul-
ture.” (26) Reaching the same conclusion, Vladimir
Paramonov, based in Tashkent, maintains that this trend
could lead to a major socioeconomic crisis in the region. (27)
Meanwhile, the Director of the Risk Assessment Group,
Dosym Satpaev, thinks that Astana has no choice other than
to abandon all processing industries and specialise solely in
hydrocarbons, uranium, hydroelectricity, cereals, and trans-
shipping. (28)
T wo  s en si t ive  ar eas :  “ Sh u ttle  tr ade”  an dC hi nes e-K az akh  joi n t  ventu r es
The individual and institutional players in China-Kazakhstan
trade can be classified into three categories: shuttle trade —
so-called “suitcase traders” or “shop tourists” — who are
involved essentially in border trade; the private entrepre-
neurs, often Uyghurs and Dungans in the 1990s but these
days replaced by the Han, who are setting up in
Kazakhstan’s most profitable sectors; and the Xinjiang
Production and Construction Corps or XPCC (Xinjiang
shengchan jianshe bingtuan), which is thought to account for
more than one third of China-Central Asia trade. (29) While
Chinese trade with the other Central Asian states is domi-
nated by the major state companies (which by virtue of
being established in accordance with bilateral agreements
signed at the highest level manage to bypass a defective busi-
ness environment), Kazakhstan, with its economic
dynamism, is the Central Asian republic that attracts the
most private Chinese trade. However, compared with the
countries of Southeast Asia, medium-sized Chinese enter-
prises are still relatively few on the ground, leaving the
Kazakh market open primarily to small individual traders
and large state companies. (30)
From the outset of economic relations between the two
countries, shuttle trade or “shop tourism” has developed,
compensating partially for the collapse of the flow of goods
from Moscow and enabling the professional redeployment of
a whole class of engineers and service industry workers who
had become unemployed with the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. In the summer of 1991, the first China-Kazakhstan
agreement was signed in Kuldzha, encouraging the develop-
ment of shop tourism: in the following year, approximately
700,000 Kazakh citizens crossed the Chinese border to buy
common consumer items in China with the intention of
reselling them back home. (31) In 2002, shop tourism report-
edly still provided employment for nearly half a million
Kazakhs, who are estimated to have spent more than $1 bil-
lion in Xinjiang between 1989 and 2003. (32) These increas-
ingly structured and organised “shop tours” (with specialised
tourist agencies, Russian-Chinese translation services, hotels
reserved for post-Soviet citizens, transport companies han-
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23. Bulat Khusainov, “Kazakhstan: Economic Development under Globalization,” Central
Asia and the Caucasus, no. 4, 2001, p. 133.
24. “Kitajskaja i kazakhstanskaja kompanii sozdali SP po dobyche zolota v Kazakhstane”
(Chinese and Kazakh companies have established a joint venture for extraction of gold
in Kazakhstan), RosInvest, 7 September 2005, http://www.rosinvest.com/news/
126039/, consulted 8 November 2005.
25. lida Ashimbaeva, “Dostizhenija i problemy kazakhstansko-kitajskikh ekonomicheskikh
otnoshenij,” op. cit.
26. Konstantin Syroezhkin, Problemy sovremennogo Kitaja i bezopasnost’ v Central’noj Azii
(Problems of contemporary China and security in Central Asia), Almaty, KISI, 2006, p.
272.
27. Statement by Vladimir Paramonov, quoted in Murat Omarov, “Tovarooborot Kyrgyzstana
s Kitaem” (Trade between Kyrgyzstan and China), Analytica, 4 June 2007, www.analiti-
ka.org/article.php?story=20070528232957997, consulted 19 August 2008.
28. Discussion with Dosym Satpaev, Almaty, 6 March 2008.
29. For further details on the different types of trade between China and Central Asia, see
Gaël Raballand, Agnès Andrésy, “Why should Trade between Central Asia and China con-
tinue to expand?,” op. cit., and Gaël Raballand, “La déferlante économique chinoise et
ses conséquences en Asie centrale” (The Chinese economic tidal wave and its conse-
quences in Central Asia), Monde chinois, no. 11, 2007, pp. 129-134.
30. Hu Hunpin, “Dal’nejshee usilenie ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva mezhdu SUAR KNR
i Kazakhstanom v ramkakh SHOS” (The future strengthening of economic cooperation
between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan under the umbrella of the SCO), in Problemy eko-
nomicheskogo i finansovogo sotrudnichestva v ramkakh SHOS (Problems of economic
and financial cooperation under the umbrella of the SCO), Almaty, KISI, 2006, pp. 146-
152.
31. Vladimir Babak, “Astana v treugol’nike Moskva, Vashington, Pekin. Kazakhstansko-kita-
jskie otnoshenija” (Astana in the Moscow-Washington-Beijing triangle: China-
Kazakhstan relations), Central’naja Azija i Kavkaz, no. 1, 2000, http://www.ca-
c.org/journal/cac-07-2000/19.babak.shtml, consulted 25 August 2008.
32. Konstantin Syroezhkin, Problemy sovremennogo Kitaja i bezopasnost’ v Central’noj Azii,
op. cit., p. 134.
c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
dling customs formalities, etc.) now reportedly consume
some $4 billion of goods per annum. (33)
The shuttle trade has been strongly criticised by Kazakh
experts, who blame it for the poor quality of Chinese goods
bought at the lowest possible prices by Central Asian
traders. The Beijing authorities have also expressed concern
at the deteriorating image of Chinese products in the region.
In the summer of 1993, the Committee of Chinese
Entrepreneurs issued an order making it a criminal offence
to produce and distribute poor quality goods, while the
Kazakh authorities agreed to exercise greater control over
the activities of Kazakh and Chinese traders. In September
1995, during Nursultan Nazarbaev’s official visit to Beijing,
the two parties signed a document on quality control for
imported and exported goods. (34) In addition, fearing a
Chinese “flood” of migrants onto its territory, Astana
refused to lift visa regulations (which Kyrgyzstan did until
2003), even though it implemented simplified procedures
enabling visas to be obtained at border posts. 
Chinese companies are increasingly setting up in
Kazakhstan. There were already 300 Chinese-Kazakh
joint ventures in 1995. (35) In 2007, according to figures
from the Ministry of Justice, 78 subsidiaries of Chinese
companies and approximately 4,000 Chinese-Kazakh joint
ventures were accredited in the country. (36) These joint ven-
tures, focused on trade rather than production, concern
local experts, who see them as confirming the suspicion
that China is exploiting Kazakhstan’s raw materials with-
out enabling the country to obtain technological know-
how. (37) Alida Ashimbaeva states that more than 600
Chinese-owned enterprises are active, mainly in the petro-
leum sector (extraction, processing, transportation, etc.). (38)
Konstantin Syroezhkin questions their real activities: the
majority of Chinese-owned enterprises are categorised as
wholesale trading companies, a vague term that can hide a
wide range of potentially illegal activities. (39) In addition,
almost two thirds of registered Chinese companies no
longer provide information about themselves or quickly
become inactive, which would seem to confirm the suspi-
cion that some Chinese businessmen obtain a legal cover
and then disappear into the underground economy. (40)
In addition, a large number of labour disputes in major
Chinese petroleum companies, CNPC in particular, have
attracted the attention of the Kazakh media in recent years.
In Aktobe, Atyrau, and Kzyl-Orda, Chinese companies are
criticised for primarily employing workers from China (who
live within the company compound without any contact with
the outside world), and consequently having little impact on
high levels of unemployment in these regions. With the
requirement to employ a minimum number of locals, Kazakhs
who work in these enterprises are said to receive lower
salaries than the Chinese and to be relegated to the most dif-
ficult jobs. (41) In addition, Astana has reportedly permitted
these enterprises to operate according to Chinese labour law
rather than Kazakh labour law, thus inhibiting union activities
by Kazakh employees, and outraging public opinion by
requiring Kazakh employees to salute during the Chinese
national anthem. (42) Kazakh courts have issued penalties to
Chinese companies for more than 300 contraventions of the
labour code or environmental standards. (43) In light of the pro-
liferation of Chinese companies throughout the country, and
not only in the border regions, some experts see a deliberate
strategy of developing a network throughout the country so
that in the event of serious political tensions, Beijing could
interfere in Kazakhstan’s internal development on the pretext
of safeguarding its enterprises. (44)
Th e mos t  bu oy an t sec tor s  o f  Ch in es ein volv emen t
China has brought Kazakhstan new technologies and modern
financial and banking structures that are capable of providing
a framework for the country’s development and its entry on
the world stage. The rapidly growing telecommunications sec-
tor is of particular interest to Chinese companies. While the
major Russian telecommunications companies (MTS,
BeeLine, Megafon) dominate the service market, China is
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33. Vladimir Paramonov, Aleksej Strokov, “Ekonomicheskoe prisutstvie Rossii i Kitaja v
Central’noj Azii,” op. cit., p. 10.
34. Vladimir Babak, “Astana v treugol’nike Moskva, Vashington, Pekin. Kazakhstansko-kita-
jskie otnoshenija,” op. cit.
35. Ibid.
36. Konstantin Syroezhkin, “Bol’shaja igra v central’no-aziatskom regione,” Ekonomicheskie
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ic cooperation between Kazakhstan and China as a factor in the security of the Central
Asian region), Analytic, no. 4, 2003, p. 21.
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otnoshenij,” op. cit.
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43. Gul’den Zholamanova, “O nekotorykh aspektakh kazakhstansko-kitajskogo ekonomich-
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establishing itself in the technology sector. As early as 1998,
China Telecom developed its first joint telephone network
with Kazakhstan. Negotiations in this area were undertaken
under the umbrella of the SCO, which also guarantees its
member countries the acquisition of technologies for control
of the Internet. In 2001, the national company
Kazakhtelecom agreed to use Chinese cables rather than
expensive European cables in the Transit Asia Europe Fibre
Cable System designed to unify telecommunication lines
between Europe and Asia. (45) In 2002, the Shenzhen
Zhongxing Telecom Equipment Corporation (ZTE) signed a
contract with Kazakhtelecom for development of the wireless
telephone network and the installation of more efficient
switching systems. In 2004, it invested more than $200 mil-
lion in the CDMA-450 network (Code Division Multiple
Access) in Kazakhstan via a Chinese-Kazakh joint venture,
Kazakhstan Engineering, 51 percent owned by Astana. China
Telecom opened an office in Almaty in order to increase its
presence in the country and provide the necessary services to
Chinese companies that had already been established there. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning the banking sphere, which rep-
resents one of the most dynamic sectors of Kazakhstan’s
economy. Boosted by the petroleum boom and the search for
quick profits, the Kazakh banks borrowed substantial sums
from US banks involved in hedge funds. The Kazyna Fund
for Sustainable Development, which governs the
Development Bank and whose role is to assist the develop-
ment of the national economy outside the petroleum sector,
is seeking to collaborate more closely with Chinese banks. In
2006, Kazyna and the China Development Bank established
a joint fund of $5 billion to finance investments in infrastruc-
ture. The China Development Bank also granted a loan of
$200 million to the Kazakh authorities for Chinese compa-
nies to build the Moynak hydroelectric power station at a
total cost of $310 million. Located approximately 200 km
from Almaty on the river Charyn, this power station, sched-
uled for completion in 2009, will have a capacity of 300 MW
that will partly remedy southern Kazakhstan’s electricity
deficit. In February 2008, the Kazakhstan Development
Bank was granted a new $100 million line of credit by the
China Development Bank for a ten-year period (46). Xi njia ng’s  p rox im ity :  Ec onom ico pp or tunit y a nd de v el op me nto f  b or der  p ost s
In the Soviet era, economic relations between Central Asia
and Xinjiang were extremely limited: Central Asia imported
livestock and raw materials from the Xinjiang, and exported
industrial products and equipment. (47) A few border posts
closed to individuals were opened, such as Khorgos, Bakhty
and Maikapchagay, while the Ili and Irtysh rivers were used
for commercial river transport. The construction of a railway
linking Urumqi and Alma-Ata had begun during the period
of Chinese-Soviet friendship, but was interrupted by the con-
flict between the two communist powers. (48) In 1988, even
before the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to Beijing, the Soviet
Union and the PRC signed an agreement permitting citi-
zens of their border regions to cross the border without a
visa. The Kazakh and Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republics
were then twinned with Xinjiang, and the first cross-border
movement of people and goods occurred, primarily among
small traders of the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Dungan, and Uyghur
nationalities. (49) In December 1991, a Chinese delegation
led by the Minister of Trade and Foreign Economic
Relations undertook the first official visit to the freshly inde-
pendent Republics of Central Asia, a trip that foreshadowed
China’s grand return to the region. 
T h e pr ed omin an c e  of  K az akh sta n -Xin ji an gt rad e
More than two thirds of China-Kazakhstan trade consists of
trade between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan. (50) In the autumn
of 1991, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng opened an inter-
national trade fair in Urumqi with the objective of develop-
ing foreign economic relations between Xinjiang,
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Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Over several months, four
cities in Xinjiang, including Urumqi, offered a preferential
tax scheme to foreign investors and businessmen. Trade
between the two regions grew exponentially from 2002, with
growth of 60 to 80 percent per annum. (51) Thus, while the
volume of Kazakhstan-Xinjiang cross-border trade reached a
little more than $1 billion between 1990 and 1993, it
exceeded $10 billion between 2000 and 2004. (52) In 2007,
trade was reported to be almost $12 billion. (53) It is increas-
ing particularly in the northern border region of Xinjiang,
which accounts for only 23 percent of the territory and half
the population, but 70 percent of regional production due to
its considerable resources, including the Karamay deposits,
the Koktagay mines, and fertile agricultural areas. (54)
Economic relations between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang have
evolved during the course of the decade. The export of stan-
dard consumer goods is no longer the main trade focus, and
is now complemented by hydrocarbons. Kazakh companies
have invested in Xinjiang in the transport, metals produc-
tion, paper, and food production sectors — for example the
company Raiymbek, a specialist in dairy produce and fruit
juices. Kazakhstan has thus become the main foreign
investor in Xinjiang, while Chinese investors from Xinjiang,
for their part, are concentrated in the Almaty region. One
of the main Xinjiang companies in Kazakhstan is Tsinkaz,
which opened a tomato juice factory in Almaty. Chinese and
Kazakh experts nevertheless state that bilateral cooperation
between the two regions has not achieved its full trade poten-
tial, (55) and that there is no genuine economic integration. (56)
Conscious of the potential, the Chinese authorities are seek-
ing to strengthen relations by organising increasingly regular
meetings at the highest levels. So it was that in September
2006, a delegation from Xinjiang met with the Kazakh par-
liament. 
This geographic proximity makes it possible to strengthen
China-Kazakhstan linkages in the area of inland transport.
For example, the Eurasian Continental Bridge project, link-
ing the port of Lianyungang on the Pacific coast to Western
Europe via Lanzhou, Urumqi, Dostyk, and Russia over
more than 10,000 km, including 3,200 km in Kazakhstan,
has necessitated the upgrading of some sections of road. (57)
For instance China is upgrading the section from Khorgos to
Chymkent via Almaty. (58) Several highways linking the main
cities of Xinjiang to those in Kazakhstan have been opened
(a matter of unifying and rehabilitating already existing sec-
tions): in March 2008, the two countries announced the
opening of seven new highways between Urumqi and
Karaganda, four for the transport of goods and three for pas-
senger traffic, via the border posts of Khorgos, Zheminay,
and Alashankou. Kazakhstan-Xinjiang cooperation is also
rail-based: despite pressures from Moscow, which wants to
hold on to its market, the Kazakh national railway company,
Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, agreed in 2006 to purchase pas-
senger carriages from the Chinese Tian Shan factory at a
cost of $60 million. It is considering the possibility of pur-
chasing additional stock from the China Railway New
Express Transportation Equipment Co., as well as rolling
stock for the transport of agricultural produce. (59)
As with China-Kazakhstan relations as a whole, relations
between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang do not have the unani-
mous approval of Kazakh researchers and a section of the
political class. Indeed, Xinjiang’s economy remains dominat-
ed by state production in raw materials and is only beginning
to benefit from the technological dynamism of China’s mar-
itime regions. Too great a concentration of Kazakh trade
with Xinjiang would therefore accentuate Astana’s speciali-
sation in raw materials and would prevent the development
of trade relations with the eastern regions of China, particu-
larly with the country’s dozens of special economic zones. (60)
Alida Ashimbaeva believes that Beijing is openly seeking to
limit Kazakhstan to the supply of raw materials to Xinjiang
in order to accelerate Xinjiang’s development at the expense
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of Kazakhstan’s economy. (61) According to Konstantin
Syroezhkin, the “red, black, and white” specialisation of
Xinjiang, that is, in fruit and vegetables, hydrocarbons, and
cotton, will cause a number of ecological problems in the
long term for Kazakhstan (management of drinking water,
deterioration of soil quality), not to mention the competition
between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan in these areas. (62)
T h e dyn ami sm of  th e Ch i nes e-K az akhb or der  p os ts
The border posts and the free zones that are nearby or in
the process of being established have rapidly become one of
the driving forces behind the dynamism of China-
Kazakhstan trade. In 1993, Xinjiang’s Science and
Technology Committee proposed the creation of free trade
zones in Inin-Zharkent, Dostyk-Alatau, and Boro-Tala in the
autonomous Mongol border region of Xinjiang. In 1996,
Beijing proposed the creation of a free zone for four players
in the Altay region, where China, Russia, Kazakhstan, and
Mongolia to all intents and purposes share a common bor-
der (the latter two are only about 50 km away), but this was
unsuccessful. A decade later, the growing role of the free
zones motivated the government of Xinjiang to propose the
creation of a China-Kazakhstan management body for the
special economic zones and better utilisation of common
border territory. (63) In 2007, China proposed a triangle of
growth in the Urumqi-Aktagay-Almaty zone that would
enable Russia to take advantage of China-Kazakhstan trade
and develop its part of the Altay. (64)
The first border post to open was Dostyk-Alatau
(Alashankou) in 1992. Located in the Almaty region, near
Zharkent, it rapidly became the main Chinese-Kazakh trans-
shipping post, now handling 50 percent of all trade between
Kazakhstan and Xinjiang, and 90 percent of the border
trade. The governments of both countries would like to see
Dostyk-Alatau become a true international transport hub;
indeed, apart from the China-Kazakhstan pipeline (cf.
infra), it has a strategic rail link — for the moment, the sole
railway line linking China and Central Asia (Almaty-
Urumqi). The amount of container freight being moved
through Dostyk-Alatau has increased rapidly, from 7 million
tonnes in 2004 to 11 million tonnes in 2005 and 13 million
tonnes in 2006. (65) Out of the 15 million tonnes that were
freighted through this post in 2007, 11.5 million were
shipped from Kazakhstan to China (primarily ferrous met-
als, non-ferrous metals, and petroleum), and only 3.5 million
tonnes from China to Kazakhstan. (66) The Kazakh authori-
ties hope that the volume of freight handled by the rail ter-
minal at Dostyk will reach 20 million tonnes by 2010.
Despite its dynamism, the border post still experiences diffi-
culties in keeping up with the explosion of China-
Kazakhstan trade. Customs formalities delay the flow of
goods by several days, and passengers have to wait for hours
while the wheels are changed because of the different rail
gauge between the post-Soviet territories and China. (67) The
market town of Dostyk, however, is increasingly becoming a
small business hub. A free trade zone has been mooted by
Astana in order to stimulate development in the region,
based on the successful model of Khorgos. 
While Dostyk-Alatau dominates through its rail transport,
the second border post of Khorgos has become the main
China-Kazakhstan road transport hub. Opened in 2004, it
is located further to the south, on the small river of Khorgos,
only 90 km from Kuldzha and 370 km from Almaty. In
2003, the Kazakh and Chinese authorities announced the
creation of a free zone to encourage trade, making Khorgos
Xinjiang’s first free zone and China’s first cross-border
zone. (68) In 2006, the goods trade amounted to more than
$1 billion, representing an increase of 35 percent compared
to the previous year. (69) In 2007, more than 3 million people
and 2 million tonnes of goods reportedly passed through the
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zone. (70) Once the Shihezi-Yining-Khorgos road is upgraded,
the trip from Urumqi to Almaty will be reduced by 200 km,
increasing its profitability. In response to the dynamism of
Khorgos, transport infrastructure is growing: a new railway
line linking Urumqi and Almaty via Khorgos is due to
become operational in 2009 and will double the capacity of
Dostyk’s rail line, which will soon be overstretched. (71) It will
be accompanied by the construction of a dry port that will
house a logistical redistribution centre, significant storage
capacity, and communication services. 
In April 2008, the Kazakh government announced the con-
struction at Khorgos of an airport capable of landing Boeing-
747s, at an estimated cost of some $500 million. (72) Since
2005, construction of a hydroelectric power plant has also
been foreshadowed by a series of small power stations locat-
ed about 20 km from the border post on the Khorgos River,
a tributary of the Irtysh. Production of electricity will be
shared equally by the two countries, and regulation of the
river’s flow will enable agricultural areas along both sides of
the border to be extended. (73) Khorgos has not only become
the main road transport point, it is also a highly successful
free zone, a model for those envisaged in the rest of
Kazakhstan and in other border states such as Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan. The free zone of Khorgos, opened in 2006,
has become the principal one in Xinjiang: more than 200
enterprises specialising in new technologies and manufac-
tured products have been established on the Chinese side.
In the area controlled jointly by the two countries, an
International Centre for China-Kazakhstan Cross-Border
Cooperation is due to begin operation at the end of 2008.
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Covering an area of more than 15 square kilometres, it will
house hotels, parks and, in particular, showrooms for
Chinese products and new technologies, which will be
offered duty free, together with all the logistical services
required for the shipping of goods. (74)
There are three other Chinese-Kazakh border posts, but at
present these remain dedicated to border trade. The post of
Kolzhat-Dulart, 340 km from Almaty, is located between
Narynkol and Khorgos. It seems destined for rapid develop-
ment, as the Aksay-Chundzha-Kolzhat road section, which
crosses the Uyghur autonomous district, is in the process of
being upgraded. (75) On the Chinese side, Durlat has been
considered an international port since 1994. Although a free
trade zone was opened in 1999, movement remains restrict-
ed: in 2002, 6,000 people, 3,000 vehicles, and 24,000
tonnes of goods passed through it. (76) The two other posts,
Bakhty-Tacheng and Maikapchagay-Zheminay, located fur-
ther to the north in the region of eastern Kazakhstan, near
Lake Zaysan, are capable of servicing all of north-eastern
Kazakhstan, and even the Russian Altay. The Kazakh
authorities are funding the upgrading of the Taskensken-
Bakhty road in order to increase the post’s capacity to trans-
port goods, while on the Chinese side, the market town of
Tacheng now has a small airport open to commercial flights.
The post of Maikapchagay-Zheminay is also undergoing con-
siderable development: in March 2006 the Chinese authori-
ties created a free zone, the second after Khorgos, able to
house up to 10,000 stands and 3,000 tonnes of freighted
goods. (77) A visa-free scheme enables border dwellers to visit
the trade zone. (78) A sixth post, Narynkol-Muzart, located
near the Kyrgyz border, which opened in 1992, has closed
due to lack of traffic. A seventh crossing point, Alekseevka,
located more than 800 km from Urumqi and close to Russia,
could come into operation in the years ahead. T he  e ne rgy se ctor ,  a  dr iv ingf o r c e  b e hi nd  C h i n a ’ s  p r e s e nc ei n K az akhsta n
Having recently become one of the greatest consumers of
hydrocarbons in the world, China has difficulty quenching
its thirst for energy: it is expected to consume 400 million
tonnes of petroleum in 2020, 60 percent of which will need
to be imported. (79) In order to diversify their supply from the
Middle East and its geopolitical vicissitudes, the Chinese
authorities have turned to Kazakhstan, which according to
British Petroleum is now in eighth position for proven
reserves of petroleum, but in only 18th position for the vol-
ume of petroleum extracted. (80) By 2020, Astana hopes to
become one of the ten largest exporters of crude oil. China’s
energy needs are destined to grow to such an extent that
Beijing is trying to diversify its sources by turning to nuclear
energy and also to coal-fired electricity. Once again,
Kazakhstan’s proximity appears a godsend, and new direc-
tions in China-Kazakhstan economic relations are beginning
to take shape around these areas.
P et ro leum a nd  na tu ra l  ga s f i e lds  oper atedb y Ch in ese  c ompa ni es
Prime Minister Li Peng began negotiations with the Kazakh
authorities in 1994, but it was not until 1997 that the China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and its sub-
sidiaries actually commenced operation in Kazakhstan, as a
result of a bilateral agreement on cooperation in the hydro-
carbons sector that provided for acquisitions of oil and gas
fields and the construction of a pipeline. China finally con-
firmed its status as a major partner in the Kazakh energy
market in 2003 with the commissioning of the Atasu-
Alashakou pipeline, the acquisition of new oil and gas fields,
and the arrival on the Kazakh scene of Chinese companies
other than CNPC. 
Despite its efforts, Beijing has not succeeded in establishing a
foothold in the two main Kazakh oil and gas areas, the onshore
site of Tengiz, and the offshore site of Kashagan. Indeed,
Astana, like the western investors in the North Caspian Sea
Project consortium, has refused to entertain China’s involve-
ment in the geopolitically-sensitive Caspian deposits. Despite
this, Kazakhstan seemed to retract this Caspian veto partially in
2005, when the China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC) and KazMunayGaz signed an agreement for
exploration of the Darkhan offshore deposit located between
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the Kurmangazy and Karazhambas fields, the reserves of which
are estimated to be 11 billion barrels of petroleum. Negotiations
for its exploitation are in progress. The acquisition of this site
has enabled China to gain a foothold, albeit a modest one, in
the Caspian Sea. In addition to Darkhan, its only offshore site,
CNPC now operates six onshore sites. China’s long-term strat-
egy is to secure supply to the pipeline by acquiring secondary
deposits along its route, enabling it to avoid pressures from for-
eign companies to supply the oil pipeline. 
CNPC’s main acquisition remains the AktobeMunayGaz
company, in which it purchased a 60 percent share in 1997
and a further 25 percent in 2003. (81) Located in the Aktobe
region, it controls almost 15 percent of Kazakh petroleum,
and in particular holds a 20-year licence for exploitation of
the Zhanazhol and Kenkiyak petroleum and gas sites, which
represent 5 percent of Kazakhstan’s total petroleum
reserves. (82) Its acquisition has clearly been profitable, produc-
tion having doubled between 1997 and 2006, when the
Chinese company produced 10 million tonnes of petroleum
and 1.5 billion cubic metres of gas. (83) In 2008, CNPC-
AktobeMunayGaz produced 120,000 barrels per day, not
quite the 200,000 they were hoping for by the end of the
decade. (84) China declared that it had invested $1.5 billion in
the site, primarily for renovation of the refinery and construc-
tion of the Zhanazhol gas conversion plant, as well as for stor-
age and processing. (85) The UzenMunayGaz site, located on
the Mangistau peninsula, also acquired in 1997, has been less
successful, with CNPC withdrawing in 2005. According to
Astana, the Chinese company did not meet its investment
obligations and therefore lost the right to manage the site, (86)
whereas Beijing claims that the site was handed back to
KazMunayGaz when exploitation proved unprofitable. (87)
After this dual purchase in 1997, six years passed before China
invested further in the Kazakh market with the 2003 acquisition
of a 35 percent stake in the Buzachi North company at Nimir
Petroleum, followed by acquisition of the remaining 65 percent
share from Texaco. However, in December 2003, CNPC sud-
denly decided to transfer half of its share to the Canadian-
Kazakh company Nelson Resources Ltd., which was then
bought out by Lukoil. (88) CNPC and Lukoil have been in dis-
pute ever since over the right of pre-emption over half the site,
but they continue to exploit it. Located north of Aktau in the
Mangistau region, it has reserves estimated at 205 million
tonnes. (89) In 2008, its daily production was 33,000 barrels of
petroleum and 127,000 cubic metres of natural gas. (90) More
than half the petroleum extracted there is sold to the West
through the Atyrau-Samara pipeline. The dispute with Lukoil
also casts doubt on CNPC’s exploitation rights to the Bars
deposit near the Buzachi deposit, the oil reserves of which, cov-
ering 5,600 square kilometres, would appear to be particularly
promising (more than 200 million tonnes).
In 2005, CNPC attracted attention through its acquisition,
at a cost of almost $4.3 billion, of the Canadian company
PetroKazakhstan. With almost 12 percent of Kazakh pro-
duction, including the major site of Kumkol,
PetroKazakhstan is considered the second largest foreign
petroleum producer based in Kazakhstan and the main pro-
ducer and supplier of refined products in the country. This
represented the most important acquisition ever undertaken
by the Chinese company on foreign soil, and made
Kazakhstan CNPC’s second production base outside
China, after Sudan. In 2006, Astana demanded that
CNPC sell one third of the company to KazMunayGaz,
which China agreed to do. The main area of activity of
PetroKazakhstan, which fully or partially owns 11 sites as
well as exploration rights to five blocks, is located in the
Turgay basin in the Kzyl-Orda and South Kazakhstan
regions, as well as the Aktobe region. (91) The company is
also joint owner, with KazMunayGaz, of the Shymkent
refinery, the largest in the country, and handles the sale of
refined products in Kazakhstan. However, this acquisition
triggered a still-unresolved legal dispute with Lukoil and its
subsidiary Turgay Petroleum. (92)
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Apart from these three main sites, which form the core of
China’s petroleum presence in Kazakhstan, CNPC has sub-
sidiaries established in several small sites in the exploration or
exploitation phases, all located close to the China-Kazakhstan
pipeline. In 2004, CNPC and China North Industries
Corporation acquired a 50 percent share in the Konys and
Bektas sites (KAM project) in the Turgay basin, which report-
edly contain reserves of 21 million tonnes of petroleum. (93) In
the same year, Sinopec acquired the American First
International Oil Company (FIOC), which holds exploitation
licences for small deposits located in the west of the country,
in particular the promising site of Aday, the petroleum
reserves of which are estimated at 100 million tonnes, along
with gas reserves estimated at 400 billion cubic metres, which
it manages with Rosneft. In 2005, CNPC acquired a 100
percent interest in ADM, which exploits the two Aryss and
Blinov blocks, with reserves estimated at 10 million tonnes of
petroleum. (94) In the same year, the China National Oil and
Gas Exploration and Development Corporation (CNODC)
become the sole shareholder in the petroleum company
Aydan Munay, which gives it control over virtually all the sites
in the Kzyl-Orda region. (95) Finally, the site of Satpaev, the
reserves of which are estimated at 1.85 billion barrels of petro-
leum, is the subject of negotiations between the Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and KazMunayGaz.
In December 2006, the Chinese investment company
CITIC Group (China International Trust and Investment
Company), based in Hong Kong, acquired the Nations
Energy company, which holds the exploitation rights to the
Karazhanbas site in the Mangistau region, the certified
reserves of which are more than 340 million barrels of petro-
leum. In November 2007, the CITIC Group sold half its
interest in Karazhanbas to KazMunayGaz. In less than a
decade China has thus become an important player in
Kazakhstan’s energy market. However, its presence is repre-
sented by conflicting figures: according to some sources,
Chinese companies controlled only 16 percent of annual
extraction in 2006, or a little more than 10 million tonnes of
petroleum. (96) This seems to be an underestimate, since the
majority of experts state that Chinese companies produced
almost 18 million tonnes of crude petroleum during that year,
representing 26 percent of Kazakhstan’s total production. (97)
T h e Ch in a-K az akh s tan  oil  pipe l in e  an dt he  Ch in a- Cen tra l  As ia  g as  pip el in e
In addition to acquiring oil and gas fields, China is investing
in the pipelines that enable it to secure its supplies, even
though production at some sites acquired by Beijing in the
west of Kazakhstan is exported to Europe via the Russian
pipelines and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC).
China’s current strategy remains one of linking the different
deposits it has acquired to the pipeline that is under con-
struction. A proposed oil pipeline connecting Kazakhstan
and China had been considered as early as 1997 but only
became a reality in 2003. The difficult Russian-Chinese
negotiations over the Angarsk-Daqing oil pipeline lent
weight to the Kazakh alternative, as did the rise in the price
of raw materials and the discovery of the Kashagan deposit.
The first section, the Northwest Crude Pipeline, brought
into operation in 2003, links the Kenkiyak field to the main
city in the west of the country, Atyrau, the petroleum capi-
tal of Kazakhstan, thus enabling Chinese petroleum to flow
to the Russian pipelines and on to Western Europe. CNPC
owns a 49 percent share in this oil pipeline, the first con-
structed following Kazakhstan’s independence. At 448 km
in length, its capacity is expected to reach 14 million tonnes
per annum. A second section, the Kazakhstan-China Crude
Oil Pipeline in the east of the country, stretches from the
station of Atasu, in the Karaganda region, to the Chinese-
Kazakh border post of Dostyk-Alatau. At 962 km in length
and with a cost of $800 million funded by CNODC and
KazMunayGaz, it is the first oil pipeline to link Kazakhstan
to a foreign market without passing through a third country.
Its capacity is expected to double to 20 million tonnes per
annum through an exclusively Chinese funding arrange-
ment. (98) Finally, a third section in central Kazakhstan, con-
struction of which began in December 2007, links Kenkiyak
to Kumkol via the town of Aralsk over a distance of 760 km
and at an estimated cost of $511 million. In 2010-2011,
when this last section is due to be completed, China will be
able to make a decision on reversion of the Kenkiyak-Atyrau
section, heading eastwards, and will link Kumkol to Atasu
by an already existing pipeline constructed during the Soviet
period. It will thus have the advantage of an oil pipeline
Chinese Economic Presence in Kazakhstan
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more than 3,000 km in length (2,818 km in Kazakh territo-
ry and 270 km in Chinese territory) and with a capacity of
20 million tonnes, linking the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang.
Xinjiang will in turn be linked to the internal Chinese net-
work, elements of which either already exist or are under
construction, and which supplies the major cities on the
Pacific coast that are China’s major energy consumers. (99)
However, the question of supply to the China-Kazakhstan
pipeline remains problematic, all the more so since constant
delays in oil and gas field development in Kashagan, now on
hold until 2013, and difficulties in moving to intensive devel-
opment at Tengiz, are curbing the ambitions of both
Kazakhstan and China. In 2007, Kazakhstan exported only
about 85,000 barrels per day to China, or 4.25 million
tonnes, representing approximately 7 percent of
Kazakhstan’s total petroleum exports and 2.8 percent of
China’s. (100) In the winter of 2007, Astana was even forced
to temporarily close the Atasu-Alatau pipeline, which was
operating at only 40 percent capacity due to lack of crude
oil, while Beijing still had not completed renovation of the
Dushanzi refinery in Xinjiang. (101) Since 2006, negotiations
with the Russian petroleum companies have been undertak-
en to encourage them to export part of their production to
China via the Kazakh sections of pipeline. The Kazakh
authorities hope, however, that once Kashagan is opera-
tional, they can become an independent player, supplying
China with the anticipated 20 million tonnes per annum,
while Beijing, for its part, hopes to have acquired sufficient
sites to be able to manage supply to the oil pipeline inde-
pendently. (102) Lastly, the pipeline should secure 5 percent of
the total volume of Chinese imports, a figure that could dou-
ble (40 million tonnes out of the 400 required) after work is
completed to increase the flows.
Since 2005-2006, a new large-scale energy project, the first
Chinese trans-national gas pipeline, has been driving rela-
tions between Beijing and Astana. Kazakhstan indeed has
extensive natural gas reserves, with 3 trillion cubic metres
proven, and additional estimated reserves of 5 trillion cubic
metres. While the country remains a small producer (27 bil-
lion cubic metres of gas in 2006), production is expected to
increase to 40 billion cubic metres by 2010 and 80 billion
cubic metres by around 2015, less than half of which will be
required for domestic consumption. (103) Concentrated in the
west of the country (a quarter of the proven reserves are
located in the Karachaganak gas fields), the Kazakh
reserves could help supply the gas pipeline that Beijing
negotiated with Turkmenistan in 2006, and would enable
Astana to collect transit duty on Turkmen and Uzbek gas
sent to China. (104) Scheduled to be operational by the end of
2009, the Sino-Central Asian gas pipeline will have a capac-
ity of 30 billion cubic metres per annum, with Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan each supplying a third. (105)
PetroChina and the China National Oil and Gas
Exploration and Development Corporation are each invest-
ing more than $2 billion in the project.
Beginning at the Samandepe well, located near Bagtiyarlyk,
on the right bank of the Amu-Daria, and reportedly contain-
ing 1.6 billion cubic metres of gas, the pipeline will cover
only 180 km on Turkmen soil before crossing the
Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border at Gedaim. It will run for
more than 500 km across Uzbekistan (the route has not yet
been finalised) and for nearly 1,300 km across Kazakhstan,
before reaching Xinjiang via Shymkent and Khorgos. On
Kazakh soil, a section linking the Beyneu-Bozoy site to
Chymkent via Kzyl-Orda could be constructed later. (106) The
Kazakh authorities hope by this means to aid supply to the
country’s southern regions, which are dependent on
Uzbekistan and often under-supplied with gas during the
winter months. The prospect of China-Kazakhstan coopera-
tion in gas is not limited to these 10 billion cubic metres,
however: the possibility of extending the pipeline’s capacity
so that it can carry a share of production from the immense
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Sino-kazakh pipeline segment between Atasu and
Alashankou (Kazakhstan). 
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site of Karachaganak is mentioned regularly, causing con-
cern in Gazprom. The Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline Company
Ltd., created for this purpose, is working in collaboration
with the national companies Turkmenneftegaz,
Uzbekneftegaz, and KazMunayGaz. On 30 July 2008,
KazMunayGaz and CNPC signed an agreement for con-
struction and operation of a gas pipeline over the Kazakh
section. (107)
K az akh  c on cer ns  over  Ch in ese  en erg yd omin ati on  
China’s presence in the Kazakh energy market is welcome:
it reduces Russia’s predominance and will enable the collec-
tion of transit rights on Uzbek and Turkmen gas, and even
on Russian petroleum. In addition, the Chinese companies,
supported by the political powers and their “good neigh-
bour” policies, often grant contracts that are more favourable
to KazMunayGaz than those of the large international con-
sortiums. China’s huge presence gives rise to concern, how-
ever, in some Kazakh political and economic circles. The
internal operations of CNPC, which brings all its extraction
equipment from China, pleases neither Kazakh entrepre-
neurs, who enjoy no benefit from increased sales, nor the
trade unions, which criticise the foreign company’s right to
bring its own labour instead of providing employment to
local workers. Some alarmist experts raise the threat of an
enormous wave of Chinese migration that would affect the
ethnic balance of sparsely populated Kazakhstan. (108) The
possibility that some regions could become economic
enclaves entirely dependent on Chinese businesses is also a
concern: the budget of the Kzyl-Orda region, for example,
is reportedly funded 90 percent by taxes levied on the petro-
leum sector, which is dominated by Beijing. (109)
Debate on China’s energy presence has reached the
Parliament. In the autumn of 2006, following the acquisition
of Nations Energy and the Karazhanbas site by the CITIC
Group, several members of the Otan presidential party
denounced “China’s aggressive expansion in the petroleum
sphere.” (110) During the debate, the elected member Valeri
Kotovitch declared that the country was in the process of los-
ing its energy independence, with China controlling, in his
words, 28 percent of Kazakh petroleum production and set
to obtain 40 percent of the market following acquisition of
the MangistauMunayGaz company. The debate was so
heated that Energy Minister Bakhytkozha Izmukhambetov,
who said that China controlled only 12 percent of
Kazakhstan’s energy resources, (111) was obliged to announce
that he would do everything possible to block this takeover,
which he ultimately failed to do. Nevertheless, early in
2007, the government of Kazakhstan passed a law prohibit-
ing foreign companies from selling their exploitation licences
to third parties within too short a timeframe, without state
agreement. 
The issue of Astana’s lack of transparency in petroleum trans-
actions regularly returns to the political stage. The Director
of the Institute of the World Market, Alida Ashimbaeva,
finds the lack of transparency in decisions on allocation of oil
and gas deposits dangerous, and notes that China is abnor-
mally favoured during the tendering process. (112) Gulzhakhan
Khadzhieva, a researcher at the Centre for Far-Eastern
Studies at the Kazakh Institute of Oriental Studies, questions
the future of the costly China-Kazakhstan pipeline if the
price of petroleum plummets and if new deposits are discov-
ered in the Tarim basin, (113) while Konstantin Syroezhkin, of
the Institute of Strategic Studies, questions the profitability of
the pipeline without guarantees that Moscow will ship its
petroleum through it. (114) Meanwhile, Maria Disenova and
Aytolkin Kurmanova, of the Institute of Economic Strategies,
maintain that Beijing’s ambitions in the oil and gas sector
should not be underestimated, even if its investments occur
through medium-sized sites. (115)
Environmental risk is also mentioned regularly. Furthermore,
China’s refusal to take account of expert archaeological
assessments carried out along the route of the pipeline has
resulted in the destruction of valuable prehistoric and ancient
sites. (116) The Kazakh government has kept a certain number
of other fundamental questions shrouded in mystery, such as
which country will be responsible for repair and security of the
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pipeline. (117) The politician and intellectual Murat Auezov, a
well-known opponent of President Nursultan Nazarbaev and
a recognised China expert, is concerned over infringement on
Kazakhstan’s sovereignty if security is entrusted to Chinese
companies rather than to the domestic forces of law and order.
He and a number of other researchers believe that China’s
acquisition of these largely unprofitable oil and gas fields is
motivated less by energy profits than by strategic interest,
Beijing’s objective being the development of a network in
Kazakh territory that will legitimise its right of inspection over
Astana in the event of political tensions. (118)
Ur an iu m an d e lec tri cit y:  A g ro win g ar ea ofCh in a- Kaz akh s tan  co oper ati on
Kazakhstan’s considerable uranium resources (almost 20
percent of known world resources, at between one and one-
and-a-half million tonnes) are of great interest to China.
More than 9,000 tonnes were extracted in 2008, and
according to the forecasts of the Kazakhstan National
Atomic Energy Agency Kazatomprom, the country could
produce 18,000 tonnes of uranium by 2010 and 27,000
tonnes by 2015, and maintain this level until 2050. In 2001,
Kazatomprom and the China National Nuclear Corporation
(CNNC) commenced negotiations to create a joint venture
for the export of Kazakh uranium to China. (119) In the sum-
mer of 2004, the metallurgical plant of Ulbinsk, located at
Ust-Kamenogorsk in the east of Kazakhstan, and owned by
Kazatomprom, opened a subsidiary in Shanghai for the sale
of beryllium, which is required for the enrichment of urani-
um. In November of that year, the two companies signed
their first contract for the extraction of uranium, which will
remain in force until 2020. (120) The 2005 strategic coopera-
tion treaty advocates the strengthening of ties between the
two countries in the atomic energy sector and mentions “the
unification of more segments of the industrial cycle for the
production of enriched uranium.” (121) In a further step, a new
agreement was signed in December 2006 between
Kazatomprom and the China Guangdong Nuclear Power
Holding (CGNCP) for the supply by Astana of nuclear fuel
to Chinese power stations. (122) Within this framework,
Kazakhstan sells China natural uranium, which China
enriches before sending on to the Ulbinsk factory to be
transformed into fuel. Negotiations have also taken place
over joint exploitation of the Zhalpak uranium extraction site
in southern Kazakhstan.
The last but not least element of China-Kazakhstan energy
cooperation is the production of electricity. Unlike the hydro-
carbon sector, Beijing’s objective is not so much to transport
this energy to the east of the country but rather to remedy the
lack of supply in Xinjiang, and in the event of a surplus, to
export electricity to countries in the south (Afghanistan,
Pakistan, India). The strategic China-Kazakhstan partner-
ship signed in 2005 provides for cooperation between the
national electricity company of Kazakhstan, KEGOC, and
China’s GRID Corporation, and seeks the establishment of
an “electricity bridge” between the two countries. (123) A first
project valued at $10 billion raises the prospect of the export
of 40 billion kw/h per annum produced in Kazakhstan,
which would make Kazakhstan the largest exporter of elec-
tricity to China. However, the recurrent electricity deficit in
Kazakhstan has prevented the project from becoming a real-
ity, although it could come to fruition in a few years’ time
with the construction of a new power station at Ekibastuz and
a 800 KW high-voltage line.
Beijing would take full responsibility for funding its construc-
tion (at an estimated cost of $4.5 billion, according to
Chinese experts, or $7 billion, according to their Kazakh
colleagues), (124) in exchange for which total output would be
destined for China. It would be carried by a 4,000 km line
linking Ekibastuz and Urumqi, then heading towards Xian
or Wuhan. (125) The former site of a gulag in the Pavlodar
region, the town of Ekibastuz already contains the two
largest coal-fired power stations in Kazakhstan, producing
some 5,000 MW. (126) Ekibastuz is considered the country’s
largest open cut coal mine and one of the richest in the
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world, with reserves estimated at 13 billion tonnes. The new
power station, with an expected output of 3,600 MW mak-
ing it the CEI’s most powerful, (127) nevertheless poses seri-
ous environmental problems. Indeed, it would be a huge
consumer of coal, which would only worsen the situation of
what is already one of Kazakhstan’s most polluted towns. In
addition, the high-voltage line to China has no provision for
connection to neighbouring Kazakh consumers, which
implies that local residents will bear the ecological costs of
the power station without receiving any of the benefits. The
power station will thus increase Kazakhstan’s export poten-
tial without remedying the internal consumption deficit.
Once again, this situation has not been well received by
Kazakhstan’s political classes and experts, who see confir-
mation of their fears that Kazakhstan will be ruthlessly
exploited by a China ravenous for raw materials. (128)C onclus ion
China has the capacity to inspire fear in Central Asia as
elsewhere. Its energy presence is often overestimated in
Kazakhstan, where the international consortiums Agip
KCO and Tengizchevroil still control more than 65 percent
of total hydrocarbon reserves. In the absence of Chinese
involvement in the Tengiz and Kashagan sites, Beijing’s
share in the extraction of Kazakh petroleum is likely to
decrease in tandem with the exploitation of the richest
deposits. The China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline, capable of
transporting 20 million tonnes of petroleum from the
Caspian Sea to Xinjiang, clearly represents an important
means of bypassing Russia, but will not shift Kazakh petro-
leum from its Russian orbit to a Chinese one, just as the
China-Central Asia gas pipeline will not supercede Russia’s
dominance in the export of gas to Europe for several
decades to come. The fear of China gaining an energy
monopoly in Kazakhstan is thus exaggerated, as long as
Russia and the major international groups remain well estab-
lished there. On the other hand, it is likely that Kazakhstan
will have to manage the growing tensions between Moscow
and Beijing for control of the key sectors of hydrocarbons,
uranium, gold, and electricity. 
In economic terms, China outranks Russia only in the trade
sector; the citizens of Kazakhstan find their daily living envi-
ronment dominated by Chinese products, just as, in fact, cit-
izens of the Russian Federation do. In the coming years,
Kazakhstan will probably be forced to abandon industrial
sectors that are becoming obsolete in the face of Chinese
competition, and will see the disappearance of some sections
of its economy, such as processing plants. This situation
could prove problematic to social stability. Nevertheless, the
development of Xinjiang and the likely formation of new
free border trade zones confirms that the China-Kazakhstan
trade dynamic brings more than it takes away from
Kazakhstan. Indeed, Kazakhstan is achieving development
in a less than propitious environment. Apart from China,
and to a lesser extent Russia, Astana has no other markets
among its neighbours: the rest of Central Asia is still affect-
ed by the post-Soviet economic crisis; Afghanistan’s instabil-
ity is holding back cooperation with India or Pakistan; and
Iran and Turkey are not as well established as was thought
at the beginning of the 1990s. 
Moreover, a whole generation of young Kazakh entrepre-
neurs has grasped the fact that the country’s future lies in its
role as a transit point for Chinese goods to Russia and
Europe, offering future generations a broad spectrum of jobs
in the services sector. This strategic position could help
maintain the country’s dynamism in the event of a drop in
the world price for hydrocarbons, on which Kazakhstan, like
Russia, has too heavily based its economic development. As
for the social problems caused by China’s entry into the
Kazakh market (corruption of officials – customs officials in
particular – drain of capital, loss of intellectual capital rede-
ployed to small business with immediate profits, etc.), the
blame can not be placed on China when such problems have
arisen in response to Astana’s internal policies and the social
change at work in Kazakhstan. The rise of China through-
out Central Asia thus acts as a catalyst, revealing the dys-
function of local economies overly focused on raw materials
and unattractive in other sectors, and exacerbating anxieties
and phobias over the social changes experienced by these
countries over the past two decades. •
• Translated by Peter Brown
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c
h
in
a
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
es
